Implications of a nuclear Iran

By Michael Rühle

Until recently, the story of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a success story. John F. Kennedy’s dire prediction that by the mid-1970s we would live in a world of 20 or more nuclear powers, never became reality.

Today, only nine countries are believed to have nuclear weapons – still a rather small number. Indeed, it appears that over the past 30 years, more countries have given up nuclear programmes than have initiated new ones. After the ousting of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the negotiated termination of Libya’s WMD programmes, there are currently only two countries that stand out as major challenges to non-proliferation: North Korea and Iran.

Just two countries, not more. At first glance, this may look like a pretty good record. Alas, this good track record may soon be rendered irrelevant. Because the nuclear ambitions of the two countries in question have major implications for the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and, hence, for the security of Allies and Partners.

Whether North Korea, whose nuclear programme remains as mysterious as Kim Jong Il’s dress code, will stick to its recent promises remains to be seen. Given Pyongyang’s long record of walking back from previous agreements, the jury is still out – and it may take quite a while until we really know whether we are not again being fooled. Yet North Korea is not our subject here today. Our subject is the Islamic Republic of Iran, and what a nuclear Iran would – or could – mean for the nuclear order, and what it could mean for a very important pillar of that order, NATO.

The Iranian Challenge

In 2003, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran admitted that for 18 years it had not declared certain nuclear activities, thereby violating its obligations as a non-nuclear member of the NPT. As things stand, what triggered these developments was not superior Western intelligence. Rather, it was a human rights group that blew the whistle on Iran’s dubious activities. And it set in train the course of events which now appears to be heading toward a decision in just a few months’ time: either Iran accepts serious constraints on its nuclear programme, or it will suffer serious sanctions by the international community.

Of course, even without these revelations in 2003, Iran’s nuclear activities were bound to get the country into trouble sooner or later. Tehran’s long-standing claims about the purely economic motivation of its civil nuclear programme were never really convincing. Iran’s quest for nuclear self-sufficiency has always been at odds with its modest national reserves of uranium. And the interpretation that Tehran was simply pursuing a smart energy policy – by gradually substituting oil and gas for nuclear power based on imported uranium – did not fare too well, either. Neither in the oil nor gas sectors have the necessary investments for such a substitution been made.

What is more, Iran declined even the financially most attractive Russian offer of building reactors and also supplying them with uranium. Instead, Iran is spending enormous sums on what will amount to a very modest and short-lived period of self-reliance. And there is only one plausible explanation for this: Iran wants to master the full nuclear fuel cycle, because it wants to be able to build nuclear weapons.

The implications of a nuclear Iran are manifold. First and foremost, a nuclear Iran could create an unprecedented domino-effect in the Middle East – in a region that is already one of the most explosive places in the world.

The Arab world may ritualistically criticise Israel for its alleged nuclear programme, yet for 40 years, this real or virtual Israeli arsenal never provoked them into going nuclear themselves. An Iranian bomb will change this. Over the past two years, virtually all Middle Eastern and Gulf States have declared their intention to start or re-start their civilian nuclear programmes. They are at great pains to avoid mentioning Iran as the reason, but the underlying message is clear: if Iran goes nuclear, her neighbours want to have the ability to go nuclear, too.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, is widely seen as a country that will not retain its nuclear abstinence if a Shiite-dominated contender for regional hegemony reaches for the bomb. Saudi Arabia’s past contacts with Pakistan, including with the metallurgist-turned-nuclear smuggler A. Q. Khan suggests that Riyadh has thought about this dilemma for quite some time – and may be quick to react once the need arises. And why Israel is particularly concerned should be even more obvious. With an Iranian President who denies the Holocaust and cryptically refers to the need to wipe Israel off the map, present-day Iran simply does not look like the kind of country to which you should not entrust sensitive nuclear matters.

The Non-proliferation Regime in Crisis

If the regional implications of a nuclear Iran are worrying, the implications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime are no less severe. Simply put, if Iran – a non-nuclear member of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – cannot be stopped from going nuclear, then the non-proliferation regime will be dealt another heavy – some would even say a final – blow.

To be sure, a nuclear Iran would not be the only problem besetting the NPT. Since the end of the Cold War, this Treaty has been subjected to a whole series of setbacks that have put its relevance into question. The advanced Iraqi nuclear programme that was uncovered after the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the limits of verification. Saddam Hussein had managed to run a secret nuclear weapons programme that entirely bypassed the IAEA. In 1998, India and Pakistan – two countries that remained outside the NPT – detonated several nuclear devices. And in 2003 North Korea, after being caught red-handed, withdrew from the NPT.

Then there was “9/11” – and with came it the spectre of suicidal terrorists. Non-state actors bent on acquiring WMD were not among the traditional proliferation scenarios. Consequently, the NPT with its interstate nature had little to offer to contain these developments. The debate about a possible “Talibanisation” of Pakistan that emerged in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 offered another frightening scenario: the emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic nuclear power.

The uncovering of the nuclear smuggling network of A. Q. Khan in early 2004 dealt yet another heavy blow to the non-proliferation regime. The “father of the Pakistani atom bomb” had traded in nuclear know-how, helping North Korea, Iran, Libya and many other states towards realising their nuclear ambitions. This quasi-private trafficking has eroded another fundamental assumption of the non-proliferation regime: the assumption that a state with nuclear ambitions would be dependent on the assistance of the established nuclear powers. The Khan network demonstrated that proliferation is increasingly proceeding outside the classical interstate regime. And since some new nuclear powers are likely to seek financial benefits through exports of technology and materials (if not actual weapons), each new nuclear power thus increases the risk of a further acceleration of proliferation.

This tendency is reinforced by the trade in ‘dual-use’ goods, which many industrialised countries continue to supply irrespective of export controls. Thus, even if the number of declared nuclear weapon states has remained remarkably small to date, the number of ‘turnkey states’, able rapidly to convert their civilian nuclear programmes into military ones, has grown and will continue to increase.

These were all new developments that happened over the last 20 years. The irony of the Iran case, however, is that it goes back to the very origins of the NPT in the late 1960s. From the outset, the true Achilles’ heel of the NPT was its energy dimension. In a nutshell, the NPT sought to prevent military nuclear proliferation while promoting civilian nuclear energy. However, civil and military nuclear technologies are almost indistinguishable – which is why some experts have always been concerned that a situation might arise such as the one which has transpired in North Korea and may now exist in Iran: a country can use its civilian nuclear programme to advance right up to the threshold of becoming a military nuclear power. Only the final steps to produce nuclear weapons are prohibited by the NPT – steps that can be taken quickly and that a determined regime could take immediately after its withdrawal from the Treaty.

Negotiating with Iran

This gloomy interpretation of Iran’s nuclear ambitions is widely shared, notably by the US and the EU. And since October 2003, the EU-3 (UK, F, GE) have been engaged in negotiations with Iran to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. The US does not directly deal with Iran, but supports the EU.

The transatlantic unity on this issue is as heartening as it is crucial. It demonstrates that the previous disagreements over WMD in Iraq did not spill over into the Iran case. Transatlantic unity demonstrates that the nuclearisation of Iran is not just an American obsession, but a true nightmare waiting to happen. Transatlantic unity has been key in keeping Russia and China on board in the UN Security Council. And it has also neutralised any effort by Iran to appeal to Muslim solidarity. And even though the US may currently not enjoy high approval ratings in the Middle East, Iran has been unable to exploit this to her own advantage.

We need not go through the intricate details of the negotiations. A few observations might suffice. First, in pushing Iran away from the bomb, the EU has gone quite far. It offered positive incentives for Iran’s cooperation, but it also threatened sanctions in case of continued obstruction. The EU questioned Iran’s “sovereign right” to enrich uranium, arguing instead that Iran’s dubious track record has made that right contingent on certain clarifications. France, the UK and Germany did not argue that Iran’s nuclear programme had to be terminated altogether, but they demanded a halt of uranium enrichment as a precondition for further talks. When this request was ignored, they transferred the case from the IAEA to the UN Security Council, thus paving the way for serious sanctions.

So far, Iran has remained unimpressed. It continues its enrichment activities, slowly inching towards the bomb. Accordingly, after more than four years of fruitless negotiations, the Europeans are getting visibly impatient with Tehran. The initial image of the US carrying the stick and the Europeans offering carrots – “good cop/bad cop” – is no longer quite appropriate. France’s recent more assertive rhetoric, including the suggestion to go for tougher sanctions even in the face of Russian or Chinese resistance, indicates that time is running out.

The Way Ahead on Iran

Of course, Iran could follow North Korea’s example and withdraw from the NPT. But to what avail? As we see in the North Korean case, withdrawal does not make a country exempt from sanctions by the UN Security Council. Indeed, it is one of the most heartening developments in recent years that the UNSC has kept its eye on the non-proliferation ball and has not let violators like North Korea off the hook. Back in 1992, the UN characterised proliferation as a threat to world peace, and it has acted, however imperfectly, to stick to this principle.

Will stronger sanctions work? Clearly, there is widespread agreement that certain sanctions could hit Iran quite hard. US sanctions have been in place for some time now, and more than a third of Iran’s imports come from the EU. Moreover, Iran is an oil exporter, but has almost no refineries. In fact, it already needs to ration gasoline. Ahmadinejad remains unpopular among large parts of his population, and the hope remains that sanctions might hasten his eventual departure, thus perhaps creating an entirely new dynamic in Iran’s relations with the international community.

The key question is whether China and Russia are ready to agree to tougher sanctions. They both have a major stake in Iran: Russia wants to continue its lucrative nuclear deals; China, whose foreign and security policy is increasingly dominated by energy concerns, needs access to Iranian oil and gas. Will Moscow and Beijing subordinate these economic interests to the objective of upholding global non-proliferation principles? I must admit that I harbour doubts. It is my impression that the increasing importance of energy is ultimately going to override the non-proliferation norm – but I would not mind to be proven wrong.

Just one brief word on the military option. I personally believe that it is a real option, that it is entirely feasible for the US to delay the Iranian nuclear programme by several years, and that even many Arab countries wouldn’t be too much worried about it. A bipartisan consensus in the US could probably be built in support of such action, and the Europeans might at least acquiesce. However, like Israel’s attack on Saddam’s Osirak reactor in 1981, it would only delay the problem. And, most importantly, a military strike would probably have so many negative political ramifications – including Iran retaliating by enhancing its support for various terrorist groups – that it can only be an option of last resort.

This brings us to the challenge of living with a nuclear Iran. The first question in this context is usually whether a nuclear Iran can be deterred. I am afraid, however, that this is the wrong question. The problem is not whether Iran does or doesn’t understand threats. The problem is that regimes like the one in Tehran are prone to miscalculation. Remember Saddam’s argument before the 1991 Gulf War that the US would not attack since they were still suffering from the Vietnam trauma and a fear of casualties? This is just one example of an endless list of deterrence failures brought about by a distorted view of reality and/or just very bad political judgement. Faced with the prospect of a nuclearised Middle East, with more fingers on more triggers, we cannot afford to rely on deterrence only. Yes, Iran might well be deterred, but it will be a rather uneasy deterrence relationship.

Implications for NATO’s Nuclear Policy

Talking about deterrence brings us to NATO’s nuclear policy. The US “nuclear umbrella” may by now be largely forgotten, at least here in NATO-Europe, but it is not too difficult to see why it will retain its importance. It is a means of deterrence, of reassurance, and not least of non-proliferation. Right now, the effect of US security assurances is most obvious in Asia, where the US presence has been able to prevent a nuclear domino effect in the region. By contrast, in the Middle East, where the US role has been weakened, proliferation now looms. To me, this demonstrates that nuclear non-proliferation is not just the result of treaties, but also of the US role in upholding global order. Or, to put it differently, the US willingness and ability to provide the public good called “security” remains a crucial piece of the global security puzzle.

Europe’s security situation has consistently improved since the end of the Cold War. It is thus not surprising that issues such as “extended deterrence” or NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements are no longer on the front burner. The logic is clear: let sleeping dogs lie. However, should a nuclear Iran become a reality, and should the dominoes begin to fall, the sleeping dogs would wake up. Because Europe would then be faced with a neighbourhood in which any conventional skirmish would carry the risk of nuclear escalation.

Clearly, the problem would be most immediate for Turkey, as she borders Iran. But sooner or later all of Europe would be faced with the question of how to safeguard its security in a nuclearised neighbourhood without flirting with the nuclear option oneself. This will be the moment where extended deterrence will be rediscovered as an intelligent way of dealing with a multinuclear reality without compromising the central tenets of non-proliferation. As NATO gets ready for a new Strategic Concept sometime after 2009, one would hope that the language on the continued need for extended deterrence will be clear and unapologetic, and not hidden under arms control verbiage.

The Return of Missile Defence

A nuclearised Middle East will also be a major driver for the last issue that I am going to touch upon this afternoon: ballistic missile defence. I am not going to talk about the technicalities of the current US system, with or without its “third site” in Europe. Because, quite frankly, these technical debates are secondary. Of course, like with any military system, Parliamentarians need to scrutinise its technical and financial aspects. But the real question is a political-strategic one: what role is there for missile defence in our overall defence strategy?

Any sensible answer must proceed from one basic consideration: globalisation has not only accelerated the risks of the proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how, but also the proliferation of means of delivery, notably ballistic missiles. Moreover, patterns of missile proliferation are changing. In the past, a customer would buy a fully-fledged missile system from the seller. Over the past decades, for example, North Korea has sold upgraded ex-Soviet SCUD missiles to Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria – and perhaps to even more countries. Today, however, several nations are cooperating on the development, production and testing of missiles. This reduces testing needs, international visibility, and costs.

Moreover, some countries, including North Korea and Iran, have tested ballistic missiles in the guise of a “peaceful” space launch programme – a politically convenient means to garner support from other countries who would not dare to engage in military cooperation. It is thus no longer enough to measure a country’s progress merely by its ground-to-ground ballistic missile tests.

The result of all this? In 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed, only 9 countries possessed ballistic missiles. Today, that number has almost tripled. And both North Korea and Iran are likely to have long-range missiles by 2015.

Just a few days ago, NATO Allies agreed on a threat assessment. It is a most serious paper that involved the work of a lot of national experts. It should help set the stage for an enlightened debate within the Alliance on proliferation more generally, and on missile defence in particular.

Such a debate is long overdue. The NATO Secretary General has recently said that he could hardly think of any other issue in modern strategic thinking “where Cold War dogmas are as persistent as in the area of missile defence.” I could not agree more. Indeed, when observing the debate over the last months, I sometimes had to pinch myself – just to reassure me that I was not still living in the 1980s!

I suggest to you that the most enlightening way of approaching missile defence is to look at it in the same way as people looked at air defence in the pre-nuclear era. Indeed, more than 70 years ago, in the period before the Second World War, Great Britain witnessed a lively debate on issues such as offensive versus defensive approaches, of deterrence by punishment versus deterrence by denial, and of armaments versus disarmament.

At the time, faced with a growing threat by German bombers, Britain had to grapple with the question of whether to approach the problem through arms control, whether it should invest solely in deterrence – i.e. by building her own bombers – or whether to complement her posture with air defences. The arms control option quickly failed. As a result, Britain finally opted for a twin-track approach. The main emphasis was put on bombers, but London also invested in air defence. The advent of radar even gave the defence a decisive edge – just in time to prevail in the Battle of Britain. Britain’s deterrent had proven unworkable in the face of a determined – perhaps irrational – attacker. It was the defensive option that helped to save the country, and thus, ultimately, to win the war.

Again, I am fully aware that these were pre-nuclear times. And I am equally aware that, during the bipolar East-West deterrence relationship, strategic defence could be seen as destabilising. In the emerging multinuclear world, however, the logic of augmenting offence with defence remains as valid to me as it was in 1940. Which is why we must look at missile defence in a fresh, unbiased way.

Conclusion: Safeguarding Security in the Second Nuclear Age

The world has entered a “second nuclear age”, in which many of the rules that were developed in the bipolar era no longer apply. The end of the Cold War has removed a specific political and military context in which nuclear weapons contributed to mutual deterrence and mutual restraint. And the lack of new nuclear rules, together with an ever-accelerating process of globalisation, has sparked developments that put tremendous pressure on the traditional non-proliferation regime. Iran’s nuclear programme is one such development; the proliferation of ballistic missiles is another.

Despite these unresolved problems, however, there is no reason to be overly pessimistic. We can shape events, and don’t have to be their victims. Indeed, developments over the last years reveal the emergence of a new set of rules that might supplement the traditional non-proliferation regime. While it may be too soon to talk of a “new regime”, some elements can already be discerned:

First, despite its structural and political limitations, the NPT will remain the central framework for identifying unwelcome behaviour and initiating appropriate responses. The transparency provided by the IAEA remains an essential precondition for maintaining an effective regime.

Second, despite the universal nature of the NPT, dealing with problem cases will increasingly follow individual approaches. This has already been demonstrated in the case of Libya’s voluntary disarmament, the handling of North Korea, and the Iraq war. It is also evident in the recent US-India nuclear deal. Each case is sui generis.

Third, the non-proliferation regime will increasingly evolve by way of UN Security Council Resolutions, with the US-inspired UNSCR 1540 of April 2004 as the point of departure. UNSCR 1540 enables the Security Council to take chapter VII measures against a proliferator, even if that state is not a signatory of the NPT.

Fourth, enhancing the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime will require a certain measure of “policing” that regime. For example, it will require coercive measures, such as the interdiction of maritime smuggling, as foreseen in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), or the enforcement of economic sanctions against certain proliferators.

Finally, nuclear deterrence, Alliance-wide “extended deterrence” and ballistic missile defence will remain the last line of defence in case non-proliferation fails.

Can these elements be made to work? Clearly, much will depend on the degree of consensus in the UN Security Council. Without transatlantic unity, however, progress will remain elusive. As the case of Iran demonstrates, if the US and its Allies stand together, they can convince others to come on board – and hopefully stay on board. This lesson of transatlantic unity should be the central lesson to guide us as we seek new ways to provide for security in the second nuclear age.

(Michael Rühle is Head of the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section in NATO’s Political Affairs and Security Policy Division.)

This Speach/Analysis was presented at the conference of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Reykjavik.

This media is intended only for personal use. Any other reproduction, publication or redistribution without the written agreement of the DTT-NET.COM is strictly forbidden and any breach of copyright will be considered actionable.

Implications of a nuclear Iran

Earlier Related News

Reuters: Top News

EUobserver.com - Headline News